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Abstract: Do expected future exchange rate uctuations aect current
social welfare? In the third-generation approach to currency crises, nancial
fragility can trigger devaluation and default. Expected future depreciation
is costly if it raises ex ante real interest rates. Given the strong violation
of uncovered interest parity, expected future outcomes' current cost/benet
depends on the currency risk premium. I extend the static one-period Barro-
Gordon welfare loss function to include expected future depreciation and
show that, when foreign investors are risk-averse, depreciation bias is higher
than the static case if aggregate demand is a function of ex ante real rates.
If demand depends on the ex post real interest rate, average depreciation can
be zero if current welfare is suÆciently sensitive to the state of the nancial
sector. In this stylised framework, depreciation bias can be mitigated even
in the presence of time-inconsistency, and expected welfare may be higher.
JEL classication: E52, E58, F33, F37
Keywords: Depreciation bias, real interest rate, currency risk premium,
social welfare
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of recent nancial crises in developing countries|South East
Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina being headline cases|a third-
generation methodology for modelling currency crises is under development,
focussing on illiquidity in the banking system and adverse spillovers from
the nancial sector to currency markets.
1
Financial fragility is manifest in
the high observed correlation between exchange rate collapses and banking
crises. Liquidity problems are amplied by strong systemic bias towards debt
nance, especially towards intermediation by banks, leading to massive short
term reversals of capital ows to developing economies.
As a result, forward-looking indicators of the state of the nancial sector
have been the object of attention alongside traditional current and capital
account measures. A prominent such indicator is the ex ante real interest
rate on deposits. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) classify a large sample
of recent banking and currency crises and nd that, in both categories, real
rates were signicantly higher in the 18 months leading to the crisis compared
to their average in tranquil periods. Expectations of future exchange rate
devaluation can, therefore, aect current social welfare to the extent that they
can inuence the ex ante real rate. Expectations of future devaluation can
also be costly if they aect current nominal wages, as in Obstfeld (1994,1996)
or the ex post real interest rate, as in Eichengreen and Jeanne (1998).
In this paper I model this channel by extending the stylised Barro and
Gordon (1983) one-period welfare loss function to include the current ex ante
real rate. The latter is related to expected future outcomes by the Fisher
equation. Thus the loss function eectively depends on one-period-ahead
depreciation expectations formed in the previous and current period. In the
conventional Barro-Gordon framework with sticky prices, expected future
outcomes are irrelevant. Actual depreciation is implemented following the
1
Illiquidity may be traced to nancial liberalisation, the shorter foreign debt structure
and the currency mismatch of assets and liabilities. See Calvo (1998, 2000), Calvo and
Reinhart (2000), Chang and Velasco (2000a,b), Frankel and Rose (1996) and Rogo (1999).
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supply shock realisation, while expected depreciation is xed beforehand.
With rational expectations, this induces equilibrium depreciation bias if the
policymaker has a short-term expansionary motive. Assuming risk neutrality
and zero forward discount bias, positive nominal interest dierentials induce
equal expected future depreciation of the home currency. However useful
risk neutrality may be in describing boom phases when risk factors seem
to have little role in discouraging capital inows, it is clearly unrealistic in
the context of rapid capital outows leading to nancial crises and country
insolvency/default. Indeed, there is strong empirical evidence that the un-
covered interest parity (UIP) no-arbitrage condition is violated: the impact
of current nominal interest rate dierentials on expected future exchange
rates is absolutely smaller|sometimes also in the opposite direction|from
what UIP would predict, reecting investor risk aversion. I therefore restrict
attention to exogenous and positive currency risk premia, capturing a range
of underlying sources of country risk.
2
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is assumed to hold in the short-term,
and the equilibrium inuence of actual on expected future depreciation is
obtained from the intersection of short-run aggregate demand and supply.
There is no uncertainty about the loss function: the extended one-period
Barro-Gordon framework is the social welfare benchmark. Unlike second-
generation crisis models, there is no xed cost triggering the devaluation
decision. Under perfect capital mobility, the present cost/benet of expected
future depreciation depends on the magnitude of the risk premium and its
impact on the ex ante real interest rate.
A related expectational framework was studied by Krugman (1996), who
argued that self-fullling crises may be an artifact of the unrealistic treatment
of private agents' expectations. If fundamentals deteriorate deterministically,
2
On the forward premium puzzle and peso problems see Isard (1995) and Lewis (1995).
Positive interest dierentials may reect banking sector fragility, excessive foreign debt,
political uncertainty, credibility problems, lack of lender of last resort, illiquidity, etc. For
related anecdotal and empirical evidence in the context of the Asian and Latin American
nancial crises through 1998 see Krugman (2000).
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and expected future devaluation is costly because it raises the ex ante real
interest rate, then multiple equilibria cannot exist. However, as pointed out
by Kehoe (1996), Krugman's result relies on the loss function being sensi-
tive to future expectations only. Jeanne and Masson (2000) argue that the
policymaker's decision is sensitive to the private sector's depreciation ex-
pectations formed during, as well as before the nancial crisis. They show
that, if the devaluation expectations aecting the present cost/benet of a
currency peg are formed in the last and current periods, then devaluation
expectations can become chaotic and a complete information model can ad-
mit an arbitrarily large number of equilibria.
3
Meyer et al. (2001) argue
that incorporating future ination expectations into forward-looking policy
rules may also be warranted in closed-economy models because of lags in the
monetary transmission mechanism.
The main results are as follows. If UIP holds, expected future outcomes
cannot aect current welfare because ex ante real rates are tied to the world
level. I study two cases of UIP violation where the risk premium is positive.
First, if aggregate demand is a function of ex ante real rates then equibrium
depreciation bias is unambiguously higher than under the static one-period
loss function, and expected social welfare is always lower. The intuition is
that actual depreciation lowers real interest rates regardless of the risk pre-
mium. Second, if aggregate demand depends on the ex post real rate, then
average depreciation can be zero if current welfare is responsive to the ex ante
real rate and aggregate demand is more sensitive to the ex post real rate than
aggregate supply is to unanticipated depreciation. The appropriate sensitiv-
ity parameter increases in the policymaker's short-term expansionary motive
and decreases in the currency risk premium. Given suÆcient risk aversion
by foreign investors, this result suggests that expected ination/depreciation
bias may be eliminated even in the presence of time-inconsistency if nancial
3
Morris and Shin (1998) show that an alternative suÆcient condition for uniqueness is
lack of common knowledge about the fundamentals. Information asymmetries also produce
real eects of balance sheet uctuations, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
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sector fragility matters. In expected social welfare terms, the extended one-
period loss function may dominate the static one provided the policymaker
has a short-term expansionary motive.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 motivates the extended loss
function and presents the model. Section 3 derives its equilibrium properties
and evaluates expected social welfare. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The one-period static benchmark
In Barro and Gordon's (1983) one-period model applied to an open economy,
s
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where y
t
and 
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are the (log) period-t output level and depreciation rate.
The depreciation target is set to zero, i.e. a xed exchange rate, and relative
depreciation aversion normalised to  > 0, wlog. The output target y

 0
exceeds the home potential output level y by k = y

  y  0, capturing
the policymaker's incentive for a surprise devaluation. Output is supply-
determined by a short-run linear Phillips curve:
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The slope   0 captures the short-run output-depreciation trade-o,
that is the open economy's sacrice ratio. Supply shocks z
t
are distributed
iid with conditional mean zero, standard error 
z
and uncorrelated with 
t
.
Depreciation expectations E
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, and hence nominal wages for period t, are
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Minimising (1) subject to (2) yields the one-period equilibrium outcomes:
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Taking expectations at t  1, average depreciation and output are just:
E
t 1

t
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k

; E
t 1
y
t
= y (3)
Expected depreciation bias increases in k, the degree of the policymaker's
time-inconsistency, or short-term incentive to push output above potential.
On average, a xed exchange rate can only be maintained if the policymaker
can credibly commit to make any non-zero depreciation rate prohibitively
expensive by setting !1, that is to pay the price of a recession regardless
of the magnitude of the supply shock, and/or if short-run aggregate supply
is vertical ( = 0).
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The resulting expected social welfare losses in the static
Barro-Gordon case are:
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(4)
Expected welfare losses are increasing at the square of the degree of time
inconsistency. If k = 0, then E
t 1
L
t
only depends on depreciation and output
uctuations due to supply shock variability.
2.2 Extending the one-period loss function
In the escape clause tradition of Flood and Isard (1989) and Obstfeld (1994,
1996, 1997) and Jeanne (1997), the impact of the short-term macroeco-
nomic juncture on the state of fundamentals is such that, by introducing
4
Calvo (2000) and Chang and Velasco (2002) argue that dollarization can also serve as
a commitment device in an open economy. See also Gale and Vives (2002) for lender-of-
last-resort issues.
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non-linearity as an extra xed cost of actual depreciation, there can be self-
fullling speculative attacks and perhaps contagion from other countries suf-
fering crises. Provided k > 0, these models generate multiple equilibria for
expected depreciation which are self-fullling. Multiplicity is sensitive to the
policymaker targeting short-term output above potential. In turn, the gov-
ernment's incentive to overcome time-inconsistency justies the extra cost of
exchange rate realignment.
5
Second-generation currency crisis models introduce a xed cost of actual
exchange rate uctuation to the one-period loss function:
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+ c
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) (5)
Any depreciation in period t results in c
t
() = c, while any appreciation
leads to c
t
() = c. Both c and c are positive constants, not necessarily equal,
and the actual marginal loss is zero. Importantly, the timing is eectively
one-period because agents form their expectations in period t  1, before the
incidence of the crisis. If this feature is relaxed, then multiple equilibria
can arise without the need for the policymaker to have a short-term surprise
(time-inconsistency) motive.
In contrast, in this paper I follow Jeanne and Masson (2000) and assume
that current welfare depends on the period-t expectational error (
t
 E
t 1

t
)
and expectations for period t + 1 (E
t

t+1
). Whereas E
t 1

t
is set in t   1
and built into period-t nominal wage contracts, E
t

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is determined contem-
poraneously with 
t
. In particular, I incorporate expected future outcomes
into the period-t loss function through the additional term c
t
= c r
A
t
, where
r
A
t
is the ex ante short-term real interest rate. This is linked to expected
future depreciation by the Fisher relation i
t
= r
A
t
+ E
t

t+1
. The marginal
cost/benet of higher/lower real rates is taken to be a positive constant c:
5
Multiplicity is also dependent on the shape of the particular shock distribution. On
the self-fullling view see Cole and Kehoe (1995), Obstfeld and Rogo (1995), Radelet
and Sachs (1998) and Velasco (1996). The link from liquidity to self-fullling bank runs
is based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond (1997).
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The relevance of the extra term can be justied as follows. First, in the
real economy higher ex ante real rates adversely aect current investment
and future output, ceteris paribus. Second, the private sector's debt bur-
den increases, damaging corporate balance sheets and raising the prospect
of a nancial crisis.
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Moreover, to the extent that higher real rates are due
to expected future depreciation, rather than an increase in foreign interest
rates, they may trigger abrupt reversals in short-term international capital
ows|Calvo's (1998, 2000) sudden stops|which can push the country to
insolvency and default. Renancing foreign-denominated liabilities then be-
comes more expensive, aggravating any existing liquidity problems, which in
turn intensies speculation against the currency. The negative balance-sheet
eects of the currency plunge may lead to a collapse in domestic investment.
Conversely, lower ex ante real rates have a benecial actual eect. The im-
pact of expected future depreciation on the ex ante real rate is determined
by the degree of foreign investors' risk aversion, to which I now turn.
2.3 Foreign investor risk aversion and UIP violation
Expected future depreciation is related to the nominal interest dierential by
the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) no-arbitrage condition. If investors
are risk-neutral, domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes and for-
ward exchange rates are unbiased predictors of future spot exchange rates,
then under perfect capital mobility expected returns in the two currencies are
equalised. Denote the domestic nominal interest rate for period-t deposits
maturing at t+ 1 by i
t
and the (constant) foreign nominal rate by i

:
E
t
s
t+1
= E
t

t+1
 i
t
  i

(7)
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Other indicators of nancial-sector (overlending) problems include the ratio of domes-
tic credit to nominal GDP, deposits at commercial banks, the ratios of lending to deposit
rates and M2 to foreign exchange reserves, the M2 multiplier, etc.
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Positive nominal interest rate dierentials (i
t
  i

> 0) imply that the
home currency is expected to depreciate by the same amount. However, the
ensemble of UIP conditions is very unrealistic, not least because of the failure
of risk neutrality to account for the capital inow and outow patterns in
developing countries. If investors are risk-averse, (7) generalises to:
E
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= i
t
  i

  
t
; 
t
 0 (8)
where 
t
 f
t
  E
t
s
t+1
is the home currency's risk premium measuring
deviations from UIP, in other words the forward prediction bias component of
market expectations. For analytical purposes, I assume interest dierentials
are strictly positive to exclude the case i
t
= i

, and adopt the equivalent
multiplicative formulation:
E
t

t+1
= Æ
t
(i
t
  i

) ; Æ
t
 1 (9)
UIP holds i Æ
t
= 1 (
t
= 0); Æ
t
and 
t
are inversely related. So as
to simplify the exposition in a one-period setup, in the remainder of this
paper I drop the time subscripts and focus on an exogenously given range
of positive risk premia, reecting the UIP violation relevant for developing
countries.
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Assuming i
t
> i

, this is the range  > 0 corresponding to Æ < 1.
Compared to UIP, positive risk premia induce smaller average depreciation
of the home currency if Æ 2 (0; 1), and average appreciation if Æ < 0. The
case Æ = 0 is ruled out as it implies E
t

t+1
= 0 independently of the interest
rate dierential. Applying (9) to r
A
t
= i
t
  E
t

t+1
and solving for r
A
t
yields:
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7
For a dynamic model with endogenous risk premia see Cespedes et al. (2000), who
also distinguish between nancial fragility and robustness.
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Substituting (10) in extended welfare loss function (6) expresses period-t
losses as a function of actual and expected future depreciation:
L
t
=
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2
(y
t
  y

)
2
+

2

2
t
+ ci

+
c(1  Æ)
Æ
E
t

t+1
(12)
The eect of E
t

t+1
on welfare in period-t depends on its impact on r
A
t
.
First, if UIP holds (Æ = 1) then r
A
t
= i

: the foreign interest rate is exoge-
nous, so expected future depreciation has no eect on the ex ante real rate.
Second, if the risk premium is positive and Æ 2 (0; 1) then expected future
depreciation (E
t

t+1
> 0) implies higher r
A
t
. As argued above, this is costly
in period t because it induces nancial-sector fragility, domestic currency
substitution and foreign capital ight. The magnitude of constant c then
reects expected future depreciation aversion. Conversely, expected future
appreciation (E
t

t+1
< 0) may strengthen bank balance sheets, stimulate
real and portfolio investment and encourage capital inows. Third, if UIP
is violated and Æ < 0 then positive interest rate dierentials imply the home
currency is expected to appreciate. This raises the ex ante real rate and
lowers period-t welfare, all else equal. Finally, if the currency risk premium
is negative ( < 0; Æ > 1) then (11) implies that expected future depreciation
lowers real rates. This may reect the notion that, in contrast to emerging
markets, in industrial countries devaluations are frequently viewed as expan-
sionary. In the last two cases, the magnitude of c captures a relative social
preference for expected future depreciation via the nancial-sector channel.
3 Equilibrium depreciation bias
3.1 First-order conditions
The necessary optimality condition for minimising the extended one-period
loss function (12) is:
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=@
t
=  from short-run aggregate supply function (2). From (11),
if Æ 2 (0; 1) then dr
A
t
=dE
t

t+1
> 0 and decreasing in Æ. Equivalently, the
sensitivity of the ex ante real rate to expected future depreciation increases
in the risk premium . It is only zero if foreign investors are risk-neutral and
UIP holds.
3.1.1 Aggregate demand a function of ex ante real interest rates
In order to compute @E
t

t+1
=@
t
in (13) and avoid an innite forward-
induction problem, I rst consider a linear aggregate demand function of
the ex ante short-term real interest rate:
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; 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where u
t
 (0; 
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u
) is a mean-zero, serially uncorrelated aggregate demand
shock.
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In equilibrium, domestic aggregate demand must equal aggregate
output. Substituting r
A
t
from (10) in (14) and equating with (2):
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Therefore, the marginal impact of actual on expected future depreciation
under the extended one-period loss function is given by:
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is undened if UIP holds (Æ = 1). However, as argued above,
then r
A
t
= i

and the ex ante real rate does not aect welfare in period t.
Otherwise, (15) is negative for all Æ 2 (0; 1) and positive for Æ < 0. The
equilibrium eect of actual on expected future depreciation is smaller the
more sensitive aggregate demand is to the ex ante real interest rate, and
bigger the more sensitive aggregate supply is to unanticipated exchange rate
uctuations.
Note that, if actual depreciation|hence also ination|was known to
follow a pure random walk process (
t+1
= 
t
+ 
t+1
, where  is white noise)
then @E
t

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=@
t
= 1, implying Æ
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 
. Thus, in principle a random walk
is consistent with both positive and negative currency risk premia, depending
on the relative slopes of the short-run aggregate demand and supply curves.
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Alternatively, equating aggregate demand and supply and solving for r
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t
:
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(16)
Ceteris paribus, favorable demand shocks (u
t
> 0) and adverse supply
shocks (z
t
< 0) raise r
A
t
. Surprise depreciation lowers it; in equilibrium,
@r
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=@
t
=  = < 0 regardless of the currency risk premium.
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Intuitively,
specifying aggregate demand as a function of the ex ante real rate means that
actual depreciation can only lower r
A
t
, thereby improving welfare through the
nancial-sector channel. The converse is true for actual appreciation.
To obtain the extended one-period optimum, substitute aggregate supply
(2) and equilibrium expression (15) into rst-order condition (13):
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= 0 (17)
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An extension along these lines is beyond the scope of this paper. The necessary
sustainability condition E
t

t+1
= 
t
is a logistic mapping from actual to expected future
depreciation. Solving establishes 

t
= 0 as one of its two xed points. The second is
generically non-zero, and the resulting exchange rate dynamics can be chaotic for realistic
parameter values.
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Equivalently, multiplying (11) by (15) the eect of Æ cancels out.
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Taking expectations at t  1 and solving for E
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yields:
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Equilibrium E
t 1

t
is positive and exceeds its value under the standard
Barro-Gordon loss function by c=. Average depreciation is higher because
a weaker home currency unambiguously improves period-t welfare via the
ex ante real interest rate channel. Excess depreciation bias is decreasing
in  and increasing in , all else equal. Meanwhile, substituting (18) into
aggregate supply function (2) and taking expectations yields E
t 1
y
t
= y:
average output is unchanged at its potential level.
3.1.2 Aggregate demand a function of ex post real interest rates
Alternatively, I now evaluate @E
t

t+1
=@
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assuming that aggregate demand
is strictly decreasing in the ex post short-term real interest rate:
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where r
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and aggregate demand shock u
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is dened as in (14).
Once more, domestic aggregate demand must clear aggregate supply in each
period:
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Substitute out i
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using (9) and dierentiate E
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obtain the equilibrium sensitivity of E
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to 
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, analogous to (15) above:
@E
t

t+1
@
t
=
(   )Æ

(20)
Applying (20) and dr
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rst-order condition (13)
yields the equilibrium expression:
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Unlike corresponding expression (17), the last term is not unambiguously
signed. Now @r
A
t
=@
t
= (1   Æ)(   )=, which depends on the relative
slopes of the short-run aggregate demand and supply curves as well as on
the risk premium. Taking expectations at t  1 and solving for E
t 1

t
:
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(22)
There are three cases: (i) If UIP holds (Æ = 1) there is zero average
depreciation associated with the real interest rate term in the loss function.
(ii) With a positive risk premium (Æ < 1), if short-run aggregate supply
is more sensitive to 
t
 E
t 1

t
than aggregate demand is to the ex post real
interest rate ( < ), then the contribution to bias of the additional term in
the loss function is positive: average depreciation is greater than under the
static Barro-Gordon loss function by the second term in (22).
(iii) In contrast, if Æ < 1 and  >  then the extra term's contribution is
negative: average depreciation is smaller than under the static loss function.
When  > , a positive risk premium mitigates depreciation bias because
actual depreciation implies higher ex ante real rates for all Æ < 1 ( > 0), thus
lowering current social welfare. Indeed, if short-run aggregate supply is very
steep (small ) and aggregate demand is very responsive to r
P
t
(large ), then
(22) implies the home currency may appreciate on average.
11
It follows that
equilibrium depreciation bias can be zero even if the policymaker has a short-
term expansionary motive (k > 0), provided period-t welfare is suÆciently
sensitive to the ex ante real rate. The appropriate level of sensitivity for
E
t 1

t
= 0 is given by:
c

=
k
(Æ   1)(  )
(23)
The knife-edge level c

is increasing in k and independent of the actual
depreciation aversion coeÆcient . Recall from (12) that the interpretation
11
Positive interest dierentials may also induce expected future appreciation if Æ < 0.
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of c as a coeÆcient of expected future depreciation aversion is conditional
on the magnitude of the risk premium. The impact of the latter on c

is
@c

=@Æ = k=[(Æ   1)
2
(   )] > 0 for all  > . Thus c

is increasing
in Æ: the nearer foreign exchange markets are to the UIP no-arbitrage limit
(Æ ! 1;  ! 0), the greater the sensitivity of period-t welfare to expected
future exchange rate uctuation required for zero average depreciation, all
else equal. The intuition for why c

becomes innite as Æ ! 1 is that the
extra average depreciation term in (22) then tends to zero.
3.2 Comparative expected social welfare evaluation
The equilibrium expected welfare losses under static loss function (1) are
in equation (4). These are now compared to the outcomes under extended
one-period loss function (6):
E
t 1
L
t
=
1
2
E
t 1
(y
t
  y

)
2
+

2
E
t 1

2
t
+ c E
t 1
r
A
t
(24)
There are two cases, corresponding to the aggregate demand function
specication (14) or (19). Inspecting their rst-order conditions, respectively
(17) and (21), makes clear that the extra term E
t 1
r
A
t
contributes a constant
to each optimisation. Consequently, because the variance of equilibrium
ination and output are unchanged from the static loss function, any change
in expected welfare is due only to the contribution of the E
t 1

2
t
term, hence
to the equilibrium expected depreciation rates (18) and (22).
It is easy to check the expected ex ante and ex post real rates are equal.
Taking expectations and substituting aggregate demand functions (14) or
(19) and expected depreciation from (18) or (22) into extended rst-order
condition (13) implies:
E
t 1
r
A
t
= E
t 1
r
P
t
=
   y

(25)
Requiring positive average real interest rates imposes the weak parameter
restriction  > y. Substituting (18) and (25) into (24) and manipulating
14
yields expected welfare losses when aggregate demand depends on the ex
ante real interest rate:
E
t 1
L
t
=

2
+ 
2
k
2
+

2(
2
+ )

2
z
+
c

"
   y +

2
2
 
c

+ 2k
!#
(26)
This clearly exceeds E
t 1
L
t
in (4) for all c > 0 provided average real
interest rates are positive ( > y). Extending the loss function by cr
A
t
is
thus always detrimental to welfare. Excess expected losses are increasing in
c, k and , decreasing in  and , and independent of the risk premium.
In the second case, when aggregate demand depends on the ex post real
rate r
P
t
, equilibrium expected welfare losses are:
12
E
t 1
L
t
=

2
+ 
2
k
2
+

2(
2
+ )

2
z
+
c

"
   y +
c(Æ   1)
2
(   )
2
2
+ k
(Æ   1)(   )

#
(27)
The last term in square brackets is now of ambiguous sign, suggesting
the possibility that expected welfare may be higher than under the static
one-period loss function. In order for E
t 1
L
P
t
< E
t 1
L
t
, the whole term in
brackets must be negative. The implied restriction on c turns out to be:
c <
2
(Æ   1)
2
(   )
2
 
y    + (1  Æ)(   )
k

!
(28)
Note that, because  > y, (28) is violated for all positive c if k = 0.
However, it may be satised if the short-term output target exceeds potential.
Given k > 0, inequality (28) is a suÆcient condition for E
t 1
L
t
< E
t 1
L
t
.
A weaker necessary condition for this involves the expression in parentheses:
E
t 1
L
t
< E
t 1
L
t
) k(1  Æ)(   ) > (   y) (29)
12
The algebraic derivation is available from the author upon request.
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Therefore, in addition to k > 0, conducive parameter values for expected
social welfare losses to be lower under the extended one-period loss function
include small Æ|i.e. a large currency risk premium |and  > . These
ceteris paribus parameter restrictions involve a high degree of foreign investor
risk aversion and a sensitivity of aggregate demand to the ex post real rate
() exceeding that of aggregate supply to unanticipated depreciation ().
However, from (27) note also that the expected loss increment is multiplied
by c=, so any expected welfare gain due to large  is bounded above.
4 Conclusion
This paper extended the static Barro-Gordon one-period welfare loss function
to include expected future depreciation when foreign investors are risk-averse
and nancial-sector fragility is costly. Expected future outcomes then aect
social welfare through the ex ante real interest rate. Aggregate demand was
considered to be a function of either ex ante or ex post real rates. If foreign
investors are risk-averse, average depreciation can be zero if expected future
depreciation is suÆciently costly, and the level of this cost was shown to
decrease in the currency risk premium. Parameter restrictions for expected
social welfare to be higher were also derived. Clearly, social welfare would
be higher in the absence of time-inconsistency under both the static and the
extended loss functions. However, when expected future outcomes matter
and aggregate demand is a function of the ex post real rate, a certain degree of
short-term time-inconsistent behaviour by the home policymaker may result
in higher expected social welfare. Taken together with second-generation
models' requirement that k > 0 for multiple equilibria to exist, this result
suggests that explicit consideration of policymakers' short-term incentives
remains a key research priority for understanding nancial crises. A nal
caveat is that any stylised model based on UIP violations may be misleading
if Æ estimates are insignicant, and/or if regressing future exchange rate
movements on current interest dierentials has little explanatory power.
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